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1. Introduction 
The fundamental premise of this paper is that efficiency wages and retention standards are 
related. Whilst the majority of efficiency wage literature has concentrated on imperfect 
monitoring of effort, we leave monitoring technologies aside and focus instead on the 
underlying output required by the firm; that is, the minimum standard a worker must deliver 
to continue his employment relationship with the firm. If wages determine effort and effort 
determines output, and if a firing standard is the critical level of output below which a worker 
will be fired, then it follows that wages and standards will be related. So, in a world where 
firms are able to observe worker output but not underlying worker effort, and where output in 
turn is a function of both luck (i.e. noise) and effort, there must exist a critical level of output 
below which the worker cannot possibly be exerting the required effort. We take this critical 
level to be the dividing line between a worker’s retention and dismissal. If the worker’s 
output falls short of this standard then he is fired; if it equals or exceeds the standard then he 
is retained and paid the going wage at the firm. We will show that the higher the wage, the 
higher the equilibrium level of effort and the higher the standard required of workers.  
The central tenet of efficiency wage theory is that wages and effort are positively 
correlated. In what follows we present a stochastic shirking model in which the robustness of 
this relationship is tested. If standards, effort and detection probabilities are interdependent 
then a sufficiently low standard will ensure that all workers are retained, albeit at low wages 
and effort. The higher the standard, the higher the implied effort and the higher the risk of 
being detected as a shirker. By relaxing the literature’s common assumption of exogenous 
shirking detection probabilities that do not depend on supply side effort and considering 
instead the more general and endogenous case in which shirking detection depends upon 
worker effort, we show that the positive supply-side relationship between efficiency wages 
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and effort is no longer guaranteed.1 Such a failure may arise when both the cost of effort and 
the probability of detection are positively correlated with effort but where the former (latter) 
is positively (negatively) correlated to the wage. This result echoes findings in the monitoring 
literature and is potentially troubling for efficiency wage theory. However, we demonstrate 
that in our case this is purely a supply side issue. For when we consider the demand-side we 
find the efficiency wage being set in a region where the elasticity of the detection probability 
with respect to effort is less than unity, implying that in equilibrium effort does indeed 
depend positively on the wage. 
Conventional efficiency wage theory has traditionally modelled worker effort as the 
outcome of binary choice decision; workers either shirk by supplying zero effort or they work 
by exerting the required level of effort. We take a broader view and model effort as a 
continuum that can be exerted whether working or shirking. Shirking in our context is 
interpreted as a neglection of duty by underperforming relative to a required effort level. It 
encompasses both the conventional zero effort view as well as more general cases of under-
exertion in relation to the firm’s effort norm.2 Our model is therefore closely related to those 
of Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002), Walsh (1999) and Strobl and Walsh (2007), who also 
assume continuous effort.3 By so doing, these authors demonstrate that the trade-off between 
monitoring and wages found in the binary effort dual labour market models of Bulow and 
Summers (1986) does not automatically transfer to the case where effort is continuous.4 We 
differ from these authors, however, by concentrating on standards rather than monitoring. 
                                                          
1 Our paper is therefore novel in that it is the first to concentrate on endogenising detection probabilities through 
supply side effort effects. This sets it apart from papers that follow the tradition where demand side monitoring 
endogenises the risk of layoffs. Papers in the latter tradition, that study the demand side effect and the link 
between supervision, wages and effort, include amongst others Bujdakova (2008), Goerke (2001) Groshen and 
Krueger (1990) and Kruse (1992). 
2 Our focus is on standards rather than the psychological norms discussed in relation to unemployment and the 
labour market by Akerlof (1980) and Clark (2003).  
3 Other authors who have considered variable effort levels include Goerke (2000), Pisauro (1991) and Strand 
(2003). 
4 Hahm and Mayer (2011) show in a model of efficiency wages and search that even when effort is binary it is 
possible that monitoring (or detection rates) and wages are not necessarily substitutes.  
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This approach opens up a new series of results linking standards to effort levels and the 
probability of detection. Thus, we will demonstrate that shirking declines when standards are 
raised. Intuitively, higher standards increase the probability of detection for a given level of 
effort. As a result, shirkers, who optimise in their trade-off between the cost of effort and the 
risk of being identified, increase their effort in response to the increase in detection 
probability. 
A question worth asking is under what circumstances will a minimum standards 
requirement level be the appropriate mechanism to trigger dismissal. Is it not possible that 
firms could use relative performance to dismiss employees? This would certainly appear to 
be the usual practice in team sports where athletes who underperform relative to their 
teammates face termination of their contracts. It follows from this that an alternative 
modelling strategy, in which relative performance plays a more prominent role, might be to 
adapt a tournament model in the Lazear and Rosen (1981) tradition to incentivise workers 
through punishment rather than reward; i.e. where relatively poor performing workers are 
sacked. From an economic perspective it makes sense for the firm to evoke such a firing 
trigger strategy if performance is noisy but all employers face the same aggregate unobserved 
shock. On the other hand, if shocks are idiosyncratic rather than common, as in our model, 
then tournaments are dominated by contracts as initially demonstrated by Green and Stokey 
(1982). Our paper therefore does not follow the tournament route but is more akin to the 
literature on standards or thresholds as part of incentive schemes. Although these have been 
typically ignored in the efficiency wage literature, they have a long tradition elsewhere. For 
instance, an early exposition by Mirrlees (1974) investigates how it might be optimal to 
punish agents who do not reach a given performance threshold. There is also a growing 
literature relating to bonuses, emanating from Healy (1985), in which CEO’s seek to shift 
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earnings (output performance) to later periods whenever performance exceeds an upper 
threshold.5  
It is apparent from the above discussion that whether relative or absolute performance 
is the chosen measurement criteria for dismissal depends on the nature of shocks and the 
underlying economic reasoning. However, it is not the whole story since legal frameworks 
and employment law may also play important roles. There are varying limitations across 
different judicial regions on when you can fire workers - see, for instance, Blau and Kahn 
(1999) for a discussion of employment-protection legislation that makes it costly or difficult 
for employers to terminate jobs without cause. If such legislation is enforced and absolute 
standards of performance are used in court or in industrial tribunals, then these legal 
restrictions may suggest that absolute standards in firing may be more appropriate than 
relative performance criteria to determine dismissals. Thus, absolute performance measures 
may be particularly applicable to legal jurisdictions with extensive employment protection, 
such as the original member countries of the European Union. The legal argument for 
absolute performance may apply to a lesser extent in the United States where the general rule 
is that firms have the right to fire at will, although even here unjust firing laws exists. 
We proceed in Section 2 to develop a model which maintains an absolute standard of 
acceptable worker related output, below which workers are fired, to investigate the 
interdependent effects of standards, effort, wages and the probability of shirker detection. In 
Section 3 we conclude. 
 
 
                                                          
5 For an exposition on how bonuses relate to two thresholds - a lower one where bonuses kick in and a higher 
one where bonuses are capped - see Murphy (1999, 2013) and Murphy and Jensen (2011). 
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2. The Model 
We present an efficiency wage model in the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) tradition that is 
extended to include a stochastic element. We consider the case where the firm observes 
worker output but where output is a function of both worker effort and an idiosyncratic 
stochastic shock. Workers are retained and paid the efficiency wage providing their observed 
output does not fall below a defined standard.  
Workers are identical, risk neutral and endowed with a separable utility function, 
   ,u w e w c e  , where w and 0,e e    denote income and worker effort respectively 
and where  .c  is a continuous and convex cost function with     0dc e de c e  , 
   2 2 0d c e de c e   and    0 0 0c c  .6 Each worker is associated with a stochastic 
output function,  i iy f e , which varies with state i. Workers choose effort prior to the 
realisation of this output shock and technology is such that    / 0df e de f e  , 
   2 2/ 0d f e de f e  ,  0 0f 
 
and  0f    . The shift-parameter, i , represents a 
random shock to productivity in state i and is uniformly distributed between L  and H L  . 
For an individual worker i  reflects relative misfortune (when it is low) or luck (when it is 
high).  
The firm’s objective is to maximise the per-worker expected profit function, 
 i f e w    subject to providing the worker with at least his outside option (e.g. 
unemployment insurance) utility b w .7 Writing this participation constraint as: 
                                                          
6 Note that the function  c e e  , where 1  , which naturally embeds the quadratic cost function, satisfies 
these conditions.  
7 Note that we have normalised the product price to equal unity for the sake of simplicity. 
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   
   
,
,
r r
r r
u w e w c e b
w w b e c e b
  

  
  (1) 
yields an inverse function in which the reservation wage, rw , depends on effort and the 
outside option. The nature of this relationship is ascertained from totally differentiating 
expression (1) vis:    , 0r redw de w b e c e   ;    
2 2 , 0r reed w de w b e c e   ; 
 , 1 0r rbdw db w b e    and  
2 2 , 0r rbbd w db w b e  , Thus, the firm’s profit maximising 
level of effort, e , is defined implicitly from: 
 
     
,
, , 0e i e
b e
b e f e w b e
e

   

   

  (2) 
The problem facing the firm is that whilst it is able to observe worker output, it is unable to 
observe either worker effort, e, or ‘luck’, i . Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that 
in some instances effort can be partially deduced. To reflect this, consider the case where the 
firm sets a ‘standard’; that is, a minimum level of output,  y , that the worker must attain in 
order to be retained in the workplace. We define a critical realisation of the random shock, 
, below which shirking (i.e. supplying less than required effort) will always be detected. 
Formally, we assume: 
   Ly f e f e    (3) 
where e  denotes the firm’s choice level of effort and e e  denotes any ‘shirking’ level of 
effort. Thus, the worst case scenario when the worker supplies the firm’s desired level of 
effort in the least favourable state of nature defines implicitly a critical state of nature at 
which anything less than required effort will be detected. The critical state therefore satisfies: 
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 
 
 
,
L f e
e e
f e

 

   (4) 
It is apparent that the critical state is increasing in the firm’s desired level of effort and 
decreasing in shirking effort: 
 
 
 
, 0
L
e
f e
e e
e f e

 




  

 (5) 
 
   
 
2
, 0
L
e
f e f e
e e
e f e





   
   
  (6) 
Intuitively, a higher desired level of effort on the part of the firm raises the acceptable bar of 
output performance (i.e. the standard  y ) resulting in more states in which shirking is 
identifiable. Thus, the temptation to shirk declines with the equilibrium level of non-shirking 
effort as potential shirkers can expect to be detected more frequently and must hence hope for 
a higher realisation of luck to avoid being dismissed.  
 These assumptions are represented in Figures 1 and Figure 2 following. Recalling that 
both a shirker and a non-shirker choose their effort level prior to the realisation of the state of 
the world, the figures reflect possible output levels. The two upward sloping lines in Figure 1 
depict the outputs generated by a shirking worker,  i iy f e , and a non-shirking worker, 
 i iy f e  . Since the firm is only able to observe output, but not its constituent elements 
(i.e. effort and luck), it is unable to distinguish between a shirker whose productivity 
realisation is  ,e e   and a non-shirker whose productivity realisation is at the lower bound 
L . More generally, the firm is unable to detect shirking at any productivity realisation 
 ,i e e   . Shirking is, however, detectable at any productivity realisation  ,i e e    
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since the revenue from shirking here falls short of the lowest output possible for a non-
shirker. In terms of Figure 2, an increase in the equilibrium non-shirking level of effort from 
0e

 to 1 0e e
  , which is equivalent to an increase in the standard from 
0y  to 1 0y y , increases 
the critical shift parameter from  0,e e   to    1 0, ,e e e e   . Thus, as the lowest possible 
output for non-shirkers increases, potential shirkers need to be even luckier to avoid 
detection.  
 
Figure 1: Critical ‘Luck’ 
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Figure 2: Critical ‘Luck’ and Effort 
 
Assuming no Type-2 errors on the part of the firm such that only shirking workers are fired, 
then the probability of a shirker being detected and fired is given by: 
 
   
 
,
, 1
L L
H L H L
e e f e
p p e e
f e
  

   
 

 
            
 (7) 
In contrast to the conventional efficiency wage story, this probability is determined 
endogenously by the equilibrium level of effort. Indeed, we derive: 
Proposition 1: The probability of detecting shirking depends positively on the 
equilibrium effort level of non-shirkers. 
Proof: Partial differentiation of expression (7) above yields 
        , 0H L L H Lep e e e f e f e     
         . 
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QED 
As Proposition 1 states and Figure 2 illustrates, the probability of detecting (and thus 
dismissing) a shirker increases with equilibrium effort since this raises the critical shift 
parameter, leaving the transgressor less states in which to hide. That is, workers who raise 
their effort level to the gratification of firms do so to the detriment of potential shirkers who 
are more readily identifiable. Proposition 1 is thus in sharp contrast to previous literature in 
which effort and detection probabilities are unrelated.8 As equilibrium effort effectively 
determines the critical dismissal-retention output,  y , we can also draw inferences between 
standards and the probability of detection. Thus, within an efficiency wage framework we 
find that increasing standards increases the probability of detection. This echoes the findings 
of Rasmusen and Zenger (1990) who, using a teamwork model of agency in the Holmstrom 
(1982) tradition, demonstrate that the probability of detecting shirking increases with the 
output target set.  
 The expected utility from shirking, which is detected only if   , is given by: 
     , 1u e e pb p w c e      (8) 
It can be shown that shirking workers will never provide zero effort. To be sure: 
Proposition 2: A shirking worker will operate in the region  0,e e . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
If the probability of detecting shirking is endogenous then it follows that shirkers will not 
necessarily exert zero effort, as is commonly assumed in the efficiency wage literature. 
Whilst shirkers by definition exert less effort than that required by the firm, they trade off the 
                                                          
8 Though not directly linked, Proposition 1 suggests a fair amount of introspection with respect to effort in 
relation to internal effort levels within the firm, not dissimilar to the discussion in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) 
and Danthine and Kurmann (2009) where the central theme is the relative wage within the firm as opposed to an 
external reference wage.  
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cost of effort against the reduction in the detection probability and do best by exerting at least 
some effort. 
 Note that if the standard is set sufficiently high, or the wage sufficiently low, then all 
(identical) workers will shirk - in the sense that they fail to provide the level of effort 
consistent with always attaining the standard set by the firm. They then will all run the risk of 
being fired. In this case we note: 
Proposition 3: When all workers shirk an increase in the wage will increase effort 
such that 0de dw  . 
Proof: This can be demonstrated by totally differentiating the first-order 
utility maximising condition (given in the proof of Proposition 2) with 
respect to wages and effort. 
   
   
              
2
2
2 3
0
2 H L
L
p
e
p
e
f e
de
dw b w c e
f e f ede
dw
f e f e f e b w c e f e
 
 






 


 
      
    
 (9) 
since: 
 
 
 
 2
0
L
H L
f ef ep
e f e

 
 
   
   
 (10) 
And: 
     
 
 
 
22
32
2
0
L
H L
f ef e f e f ep
e f e

 
   
    
      
 (11) 
QED. 
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The conventional efficiency wage result that wages and effort are positively correlated is 
retained. Higher wages increase the fear of dismissal and induce shirkers to raise effort, albeit 
not necessarily to the required standard. 
We are now able to draw inferences as regards how shirkers react to standards within 
the firm and outside opportunities. 
Proposition 4: Shirkers will exert: (a) more effort the higher the standard, y  (as 
reflected by a higher e ) set by the firm; and (b) less effort the higher 
the outside option utility, b: 
Proof:  Part (a) can be demonstrated by totally differentiating the first-order 
utility maximising condition (given in the proof of Proposition 2) with 
respect to shirking effort, e, and standard (i.e. non-shirking) effort, e
*
: 
 
   
       
        
2
2
2
3
0
p
e e
p
e
L
L H L
b wde
de b w c e
f e f e f e b wde
de f e b w c e f e

  


 
 


 
 
  
   

   
   
    
 (12) 
where      
2
2f e f e f e   . Part (b) can similarly be proven by 
differentiating this condition with respect to shirking effort, e, and 
outside option utility, b, yielding: 
   
   
              
2
2
2 3
0
2 H L
L
p
e
p
e
f e
de
db b w c e
f e f ede
db
f e f e f e b w c e f e
 
 





 
  
   

 
  
   
       
     
(13) 
QED. 
Proposition 4 reflects the considerations a potential shirker makes with respect to the 
possibility of being detected and fired, and so forfeiting wages in exchange for 
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unemployment utility. Increasing the standard,  y  (i.e. raising the required non-shirking effort 
level e
 ), as in part (a), is equivalent to the firm becoming less tolerant as regards low output. 
Thus, the probability of being detected is effectively increased as result of the firm’s higher 
standards. To countervail this effect, the shirker responds by increasing effort. The penalty of 
being detected is simply the difference between the wage if employed and unemployment 
utility if fired. Any increase in the latter, as in part (b), will have an adverse effect on effort. 
This is a common result in the traditional shirking literature, where typically no one shirks in 
equilibrium. The novel aspect here is that this result translates into a situation where some or 
all workers shirk. 
Consider now the worker’s decision problem over effort vis. supplying the effort 
required to attain the standard and supplying a lower (i.e. shirking) level of effort. The 
surpluses from shirking and not shirking are respectively    1pb p w c e  
 
and  w c e
. Thus, the worker’s decision problem is: 
        max , 1
e
u w e p e b p e w c e       (14) 
where: 
 
 
 
,
0
1L
H L
p p e e
e e
f e
otherwisef e


 



    

 


  
  
    
  (15) 
Clearly, there will either be an interior or corner solution to this maximisation problem. If the 
former, then the worker’s optimal choice of effort, , is derived implicitly from the first 
order condition: 
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,
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e f e
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w b c e
f e

 

 


  
    
   

 
   
  

 (16) 
Intuitively, a potential shirker will provide effort up to the point at which the marginal benefit 
from so doing, namely the reduction in the probability of losing the rent of wages over 
unemployment insurance, equals the marginal cost of increasing effort. 
Given the probability of detection, the supply of effort from non-shirking workers will 
be determined by an incentive compatible ‘non-shirking constraint’ (NSC). This specifies the 
lowest wage a worker will accept in return for supplying a given level of effort or, 
equivalently, the maximum effort supplied for a given wage. Intuitively, workers will provide 
the firm’s required level of effort, e , if the expected utility from so doing is at least as great 
as that from shirking. The NSC is thus: 
     1w c e pb p w c e       (17) 
Satisfaction of the NSC implies an incentive compatible (i.e. efficiency) wage schedule: 
   c e c e
w b
p


 
  
  
  (18) 
The efficiency wage, w , is the lowest wage compatible with the provision of a given level 
of non-shirking effort e  (i.e. the standard y ). It is increasing in the worker’s outside 
unemployment opportunity, b, and effort cost,  .c , since the firm will have to pay more to 
induce effort when alternative employment prospects are good and when the supply of effort 
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is more onerous. In contrast, the wage is decreasing in the probability of detection, with 
workers becoming more wary of shirking as the risk of detection increases. Higher detection 
probabilities thus shade the necessary effort-inducing wage that the firm is obliged to offer. 
Since both the cost of effort and the probability of detection are positively correlated with 
effort but oppositely (i.e. cost of effort - positively; probability of detection – negatively) 
correlated with the wage, a new complexity has arisen whereby the relationship between the 
incentive compatible wage and effort is not unambiguously positive. To be sure: 
Proposition 5: A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the positive supply-side 
correlation between the (efficiency) wage and (non-shirking) effort (i.e. 
0e w    ) is that the elasticity of the probability of detection with 
respect to the latter, 
* , is less than unity.  
Proof:  From (18) it follows that: 
           1
e p pe
pw c e e c e c ec e c e c e
e p

 
    
 


 
            
 (19) 
where    0p e e p       denotes the elasticity of the probability 
of detection with respect to effort and  ,p p e e     . Since 
    0c e e c e      by the convexity of the cost function, the 
proposition follows.9 
QED. 
Proposition 5 illustrates a potential fissure in the positive link between efficiency wages and 
effort. Only by constraining the effect of effort on the probability of detection to be relatively 
small as compared to the effect of effort on the worker’s cost (i.e. disutility of effort), are we 
able to retain the intuitively attractive positive correlation between the supply of effort and 
wages. This condition resembles those in Walsh (1999) and Strobl and Walsh (2007), both of 
                                                          
9 Proposition 5 contains a sufficiency but not a necessary requirement since effort may rise with the wage even 
if 1   when  c   is sufficiently convex or when the difference between shirking and non-shirking effort is 
sufficiently small. 
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whom find that whether wages are positively or negatively related to the level of monitoring 
depends critically on the shape of the worker’s effort supply curve and, in particular, whether 
the elasticity of the worker’s disutility of effort is increasing or decreasing in effort. 
Proposition 5 in isolation raises concerns over the central efficiency wage tenet of a positive 
correlation between wages and effort. 
The concern deepens when, in a similar manner, we draw conclusions regarding the 
level of effort exertion and changes in unemployment insurance: 
Proposition 6: A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the negative supply-side 
correlation between unemployment insurance and (non-shirking) effort 
(i.e. 0.e b
   ) is that the elasticity of the probability of detection with 
respect to the latter, 
* , is less than unity.  
Proof: The proof follows the proof of Proposition 5 closely and is therefore 
omitted. 
QED. 
Thus, and contrary to previous efficiency literature, we are no longer certain that higher 
unemployment insurance results in lower effort. 
We now turn to the firm’s behaviour when it sets standards at such a level that no 
workers shirk in equilibrium. The analysis surrounding Propositions 5 and 6 is supply driven; 
rather than tying down a particular wage-effort combination, it investigated an incentive 
compatible locus of wage and effort combinations. To identify the equilibrium level of effort 
and the efficient wage from this locus, we turn to the demand side where the firm maximises 
profits subject to workers behaving according to their previously determined supply (i.e. pay-
effort) schedule. Thus, armed with the knowledge of how workers respond in terms of effort 
to changes in pay, the firm will set the level of compensation that maximises profit. We now 
derive: 
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Proposition 7: The firm will always choose an operational wage such that 
0e w    . 
Proof From (2) and (18) it follows that: 
 
     
 
     
2
1
0
p
e
i
p
pe
i
c e c e c e
f e
e p
c e c e c e
f e
p





 


 

       


     
 (20) 
Note that since the left hand side of (18) is positive the right hand side 
by deduction also has to be positive. From expression (19) the 
proposition follows. 
QED. 
Proposition 7 thus stands in contrast to the discussion following Proposition 5 which 
suggested that workers would, under certain circumstances, want to reduce their effort in 
response to an increase in wages. Indeed, it offers a resolution to the problematic result, 
contrary to the central premise of the efficiency wage literature, that higher wages might in 
some situations induce lower effort. Proposition 7 states that firms will always set wages such 
that the positive efficiency wage correlation between wages and effort holds. There is, 
however, no internal conflict between the conditions that underpin Proposition 5 and 
Proposition 7. For whilst Proposition 5 merely reflects supply responses, both demand and 
supply factors play a role in Proposition 7. Note that given Proposition 7, and given the close 
relationship between Proposition 5 and Proposition 6, it must also be true that the firm 
operates in a region where an increase in unemployment insurance will induce a decline in 
effort. 
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3. Final Comments 
Our model as it stands illustrates a more nuanced picture regarding wages, effort and 
standards than previously acknowledged. Shirkers are no longer those workers who provide 
zero effort. They are instead those who neglect their duties by working less than required and 
who act rationally in so doing by trading off the cost of effort and the probability of detection. 
Thus, they work harder the higher the wage and the higher the standard set by the firm. By 
assuming continuous effort and endogenous detection, we identify conditions under which 
higher wages reduce effort whereas higher unemployment insurance increases effort, both of 
which raise questions regarding the validity of the efficiency wage literature. We nevertheless 
offer a resolution to this set of two potentially disturbing results as our case is demonstrated 
to apply only to the supply side. For when we also take the into account demand side it 
becomes evident that the firm will always choose to to operate in the region where workers 
respond to higher wages or lower unemployment insurance by increasing effort.  
 Monitoring technology has been central to large swathes of the efficiency wage 
literature. And whilst there are good and natural reasons for this, a departure from a focus on 
monitoring to one where observable output is used as a signal for effort has allowed us to 
construct a stochastic efficiency wage model within which we can investigate the largely 
neglected connections between standards and efficiency wages. The model we have proposed 
is one in which workers face idiosyncratic shocks to their output. As such, it is natural that 
the firm should use absolute performance criteria when considering firing. Were we to alter 
this assumption and consider the case where shocks instead are common to all workers, it 
may be more appropriate to use relative performance measures, with a relatively poor 
performance by a worker being used as the trigger mechanism resulting in a dismissal. Whilst 
such ‘avoid the drop’ tournaments are worthy of further investigation, they have remained 
unexplored here and are instead left for future research.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The strict inequality e e  follows by definition. The strict inequality 0e   follows from first rewriting the 
expected utility from shirking as: 
     
 
 
   , 1
L f e
Lf e
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 
  
 (A1) 
The optimal level of shirking effort is derived from the first- and second-order conditions: 
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Since  
0
lim 0
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  and  
0
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. Given that  
0
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e
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   we have: 
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 (A4) 
Supplying zero effort is therefore not optimal. 
QED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
